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Showing posts with label safety. Show all posts
Showing posts with label safety. Show all posts

Thursday, May 15, 2014

Brain research tracks internet safety performance, dispels assumptions, identifies traits of those at-risk

Internet users face a barrage of information with each click, some of it designed to compromise security and privacy. Spammers hope, and security researchers have warned, that users cannot distinguish legitimate websites from dangerous ones and do not heed browser safety warnings.

However, new research from the University of Alabama at Birmingham suggests that users pay more attention to Internet safety than previously assumed. In a paper that won the "Distinguished Paper Award" at the 2014 Network and Distributed Systems Security Symposium, researchers used a novel methodology to gain new neurological insights into how users face security questions and how their personalities might affect their performance.

Nitesh Saxena, Ph.D., associate professor in the Department of Computer and Information Sciences and a core member of the Center for Information Assurance and Joint Forensics Research, wondered what was happening in Internet users' brains when they encountered malware warnings or malicious websites.

"Many computer-based lab studies on user-centered security have concluded that users do not pay attention to these tasks and are ill-equipped to pay attention to security warnings," Saxena said. "I had been taught for years that users are careless when it comes to security endeavors."

However, security studies in lab settings show different results than a recent study based on real-world user data, he says.

He teamed up with Rajesh Kana, Ph.D., associate professor of psychology, and UAB graduate research assistants Ajaya Neupane (lead student author) and Michael Georgescu, as well as Keya Kuruvilla, a Department of Psychology student, to use brain imaging to discover what is really happening in users' brains as they encounter security questions.

Users were given two tasks. First, they were shown intermingled examples of popular websites' real login pages and fraudulent replications of those pages and were asked to determine which were real and which were fake -- phishing -- sites. Users were then asked to read several sample news articles and were interrupted by pop-ups that contained either benign information or warnings about malware, software created to obtain unauthorized access to a computer's resources and collect information.

Using a functional magnetic resonance imaging, or fMRI, machine, researchers measured users' accuracy while tracking their brain activity. Results showed activation in areas of the brain associated with attention, decision-making and problem-solving. Activity in the brain's decision-making regions carried across both tasks, suggesting that accuracy at one task could predict accuracy at the other.

"For both tasks we found brain activity, so people are not careless," Saxena said. "But whether or not their decisions are valid is a different situation."

Accuracy in the malware warning task was about 89 percent, and the fMRI scans showed high brain activity in regions associated with problem-solving and decision-making.

"In the warning task, people seem to make extra effort to make decisions," Saxena said. "When they were subject to warnings, there was also activity in language comprehension areas. Warnings trigger some sort of thought process in people's brains that there is something unusual going on."

Accuracy in identifying real versus fake websites was low at only about 60 percent -- only 10 percent better than a random guess, though participants showed activation in brain regions associated with decision-making.

"In the phishing task, users didn't do very well," Saxena said. "That may be because they don't know what to look for. When they look at a website, they might be paying attention only to the look and feel of the website instead of the URL, which is often a real indicator."

Researchers also had users complete a personality assessment to measure their impulsiveness, and the fMRI results showed differences in how highly impulsive users behaved.

"Not all individuals are alike," Saxena said. "We found a negative correlation of impulsivity and brain activity. Highly impulsive people probably just hit 'yes' when they are stopped by a malware warning asking if they want to proceed. This is interesting because it offers a way to predict how people may perform in security tasks based on impulsivity scores."

The relationship between personality traits like impulsivity and brain responses was especially interesting, Kana says.

"Participants with greater impulsive traits showed less brain activity in key decision-making areas of the brain during security decisions," Kana said.

The study could help security programmers focus their attention on designing better warning systems, and network managers target their security training at users who tend to be impulsive, Neupane says.

Cite This Page:

University of Alabama at Birmingham. "Brain research tracks internet safety performance, dispels assumptions, identifies traits of those at-risk." ScienceDaily. ScienceDaily, 28 February 2014. .University of Alabama at Birmingham. (2014, February 28). Brain research tracks internet safety performance, dispels assumptions, identifies traits of those at-risk. ScienceDaily. Retrieved May 5, 2014 from www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2014/02/140228121130.htmUniversity of Alabama at Birmingham. "Brain research tracks internet safety performance, dispels assumptions, identifies traits of those at-risk." ScienceDaily. www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2014/02/140228121130.htm (accessed May 5, 2014).

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Wednesday, June 20, 2012

SSL certificate safety bolstered by standards that lessen dependence on CAs

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Filed Under: Featured, Privacy

SSL Padlock courtesy of Shutterstock2011 was a bad year for certificate authorities (CAs) and the privacy of internet users as multiple successful attacks against CAs resulted in a reduction in confidence of the basic structure of trust that SSL/TLS depend on.

Last summer Moxie Marlinspike proposed a new system called Convergence that puts the decision about who to trust in the hands of users. There are some technical challenges with Marlinspike's approach and to date not many people have embraced the technology.

Within the last 6 months, two new proposals have come forward that look to make a more gradual, compatible transition away from the current model possible.

One proposed by Google engineers is called Public Key Pinning Extension for HTTP, while another similar idea backed by Marlinspike and Trevor Perrin is called Trust Assertions for Certificate Keys (TACK).

Some browsers like Google's Chrome have already implemented a similar approach called certificate pinning, but the implementation doesn't scale. Google Chrome ships with a set of pre-defined high-profile certificates installed for services like Gmail that are "pinned" and do not rely on CAs to validate.

This is how the DigiNotar CA breach was discovered. Users of Chrome and Gmail in Iran began getting warnings that their traffic was being intercepted by a man-in-the-middle attack through falsely signed certificates.

Hard coding certificates for more than a handful of sites is highly impractical though, and these new proposals address the scalability problem in an elegant way.

Initial contact to an HTTPS server will work the same as it does now, relying on CAs to verify you are talking to the right site. However for sites that would support these new extensions they could offer an extra digital signature of their certificate signed by the site owner.

Push pin courtesy of ShutterstockYour browser could keep a copy of this signature and "pin" it to identify a known public key that represents that site.

Subsequent visits would then check the signature of any certificates presented not only with the CAs, but also against the copy of the public key you pinned from a previous visit.

This means an attacker wishing to perform a man-in-the-middle attack would not only have to compromise a certificate authority, but also compromise the private key possessed by the web site operator.

Ultimately it lessens our dependence on the security of CAs by putting more power in the hands of web site operators and individuals.

This diversification of trust is a necessary step toward more independent verification of trust and potentially eliminating the need for CAs in the future.

Both proposals are in draft form with the IETF and there are many technical details not covered here. If you want to understand the differences and specifics, I recommend reading the proposals themselves as they are not terribly long.

http://twitter.com/chetwisniewski

SSL Padlock and Push pin images courtesy of Shutterstock.


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